Introduction
Students of guardianship taking their first look at Bentham's writings on the subject might well ask themselves whether these explain guardian-ward relations better than Blackstone's earlier exposition.
1 Bentham's well-known antipathy towards
Blackstone may be part of the reason he felt it necessary to write on the same subject and without acknowledgement of Blackstone (or any other regarded authority on the subject). While no attempt is made at a point-by-point comparison between Bentham's views and Blackstone's it is contended that what Bentham had to say on the subject was of more importance.
Bentham's treatment of guardianship is brief compared with his approach to most other subjects but its succinctness is accompanied by clarity of exposition that helps in drawing out main themes and arguments. It was nevertheless necessary in writing this article to strike a balance between, on the one hand, commenting on matters that seem implicit in Bentham's account or which seemed logically to follow a particular statement as against, on the other hand, speculating about what Bentham would have said had he discussed the subject at greater length. It was, however, judged appropriate to conjecture at some points on the influence of Bentham's views on subsequent developments and contemporary issues.
A central proposition implicit in Bentham's account was that guardianship is beneficial to wards. We do not know whether 'benefit' carried an aspirational meaning or if Bentham was simply 'speaking as he found', i.e., of the situation as he appraised it. We do not have evidence of benefits that wards actually gained, i.e.
collected data or factual accounts of actual persons' experience. Nor do we glean an idea of the time factor: was 'benefit' assumed to be a constant or was it a variable that might apply in different degrees and different stages of the relation? In the absence of 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England , 4 vols., Oxford, 1765-9, vol. 1, pp. 461-66.
evidence of these kinds, a different approach to evaluation is required. What is attempted here therefore is an appraisal of the integrity and intention behind
Bentham's assertion of benefit. Did these assertions alongside his other ideas provide a firm foundation upon which beneficial outcomes could be predicted?
This presentation firstly brings together and summarises Bentham's main statements on guardianship that are contained in his Writings on the Civil Code and from
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Brief reference is also made to Of Laws in General.
The article then proceeds to discuss the key issues and questions to which these statements give rise, setting the scene for a consideration of
Bentham's major contribution to the subject: the special elements of the guardianward relation at the heart of the guardianship concept. The discussion of guardianward relations that follows considers key elements in the relation under four headings:
Trust and Protection, Agency and Representation, Power Dimensions and
Fiduciary Dimensions. No attempt is made to review the substantial bodies of literature on these subjects that have accumulated since Bentham's time. The task is confined to explaining their part in identifying the features that distinguish guardian-ward relations from others.
Bentham's main statements
Generally speaking, Bentham maintains, we are the best judges of our own best interests: 'For who should know so well as you do what it is that gives you pain or pleasure?' 2 Putative wards' lack of 'knowledge, inclination and physical power prevents these persons securing their own wellbeing, furthering their own best interests and achieving the happiness that others gain through their own efforts. 3 Wards are perceived as intellectually or motivationally 'deficient' through young age or mental disorder. These two conditions apply respectively:
1. Where a man's intellect is not yet arrived at that state which it is capable of directing his own inclination in the pursuit of happiness; this is the case of infancy.
2. Where by some particular known or unknown circumstance his intellect has either never arrived at that state, or having arrived at it has fallen from it; which is the case of insanity. 4 In describing guardianship as part of, or as an adjunct to, family relationships called 'a trust of a private nature' 5 or 'domestic magistracy'. 6 Bentham seemed to mainly have in mind younger wards 'living within the compass of the same family'. 7 From a wider purview, Bentham located guardian-ward relations in a class of superior-subordinate relations consisting of two categories that are distinguished by whether they benefit the superior or the subordinate. Guardian-ward relations benefit the ward, viz.: 'A guardian is one who is invested with power over another[...] called a ward; the power being exercised for the benefit of the ward'. 8 And further, 'If it be for the sake of the inferior that the power is established, then the superior is termed a guardian; and the inferior his ward'.
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The role of guardians is likened to that of trustees, persons entrusted to ensure that wards benefit by giving them the best chance of attaining 'the greatest quantity of happiness which his faculties, and the circumstances he is in, will admit of'. As to how long guardianship should last, the general principle Bentham conveyed was that guardianship would cease once a ward was 'exhibiting the quantity of intelligence which is sufficient for the purposes of self-government'.
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Guardianships for mentally disordered wards should last until such a person 'be of sound mind and understanding'. 17 However, for youngsters Bentham said it was necessary to presume that after a certain period all these wards should be deemed to be independent, i.e. person as a physical body. 27 May's analysis also follows Bentham in helping to identify ways of achieving happiness as well as pinpointing obstacles that may stand in its way.
Goodin takes May's approach a stage further in identifying the main impediment to achieving happiness as the vulnerability that arises from a person's limitations in one or more of these aspects of his/her life and dependence on another to compensate for these. 28 The fiduciary concept as articulated by Bentham helps to explain why a special relation is required to combat a person's vulnerability.
A notable effect of the way Bentham brings together youngsters and mentally disordered persons together as the group for whom guardianship was intended is that the 'deficiency' of underdeveloped or diminished intellect is a perceived as a common denominator. In so doing he effectively identifies a 'generic' identity of prospective wards and thereby made substantial progress over Blackstone's account that only considered the position of children. Even so, it is notable that Bentham pays less attention to the situation of mentally disordered and/or older persons than to youngsters. It is difficult, for instance, to think of the needs (let alone the happiness) of these persons without at the same time considering the role of institutional care. We do not know whether Bentham perceived such forms of care as alternatives to or as complementing guardianship, though we may presume that it was only the least disordered who remained at home subject to guardianship.
Following on from questions about the characteristics of wards it would be instructive to ask how putative wards were selected or whether there were recognised 'triggers' or 'starting points', i.e. particular situations or circumstances, that would lead to guardianship being initiated for these persons. It seems safe to assume, however, that
Bentham understood that whatever process was in place required proper procedures and careful consideration because it was these procedures that provided necessary safeguards against blanket judgements inappropriately or hastily applied. Bentham would have been well aware that such judgements could contribute to the perpetuation of social ills such as when persons were deemed incapable of knowing their own best interests for the benefit of others, as in the case of forced child labour and in the unjustified compulsory incarceration of mentally ill people. As against the difficulty of determining whether wards benefited from guardianship in the way Bentham seemed to assume, some specific ways he expected wards to gain can be stated, namely in receiving protection of their persons and property and by representation of their interests. He also refers to procuration as an undefined benefit from guardianship that, we may surmise, covered the various kinds of practical help, including material gain, which guardians could secure for wards. As to protection of wards' property it appears that Bentham accepted that the person and property distinction had practical significance so that for the protection of children's inheritance, for example, there could even be circumstances requiring the appointment of two guardians, each representing two sets of interestswards' persons, on the one hand, and their property, on the other. 29 We might wonder, It would be interesting to know whether Bentham envisaged guardians confronting wards' 'deficiencies' solely through attending to personal factors rather than addressing the social circumstances in which they lived. Guardians would probably experience considerable difficulty grappling with individual examples of poor housing, lack of employment or poverty and it seems that for the most part
Bentham expected social problems to be addressed not through the one-to-one form of guardian-ward relation but through the operation of a National Charity Company. 
Essential elements of the guardian-ward relation
The above discussion, albeit speculative in some respects, has hopefully demonstrated that at the heart of Bentham's conception of guardianship was the relation of guardian and ward, i.e., two persons correlatively connected by their specific roles and statuses. His statements about the nature of the relation express a number of concepts-trust, power, fiduciary, procuration, interdiction -some of these in combination, and part of the task of the following analysis entails separating their meanings and relating them to other concepts that Bentham either did not discuss or which he gave less attention: protection, representation, agency, authority and empowerment.
There is no explicit distinction in Bentham's account between the protective and representational roles for guardians. We are therefore not sure whether he perceived guardian-ward relations as containing two distinct facets: trustee-beneficiary relations that afford protection and agent-principal type relations that provide personal representation. It is nevertheless argued that these concepts are implicit in his discussion of guardians' roles, the two functions being enjoined within guardianship by the fiduciary dimension. The two functions that Bentham effectively merged are discussed separately.
It is also argued that these functions together with their respective rationales provide a clearer and more precise description of guardians' responsibilities than those offered by Blackstone ('protection', 'maintenance' and 'education' 
Trust and protection
Protective Situations such as the one described above might suggest some scepticism on
Bentham's part as to how much trust could realistically be vested in guardians but for the most part his account supports the view that trust relations between guardian and ward are the basis for ensuring that protective intentions translate into protective reality, both for the ward him/herself and for his/her property. How he perceived trust relations in general is shown in his definition of trusts:
A trust is, where there is any particular act which one party, in the exercise of some power, or some right, which is conferred on him, is bound to perform for the benefit of another. Or, more fully, thus: A party is said to be invested with a trust, when being invested with a power, or with a right, there is a certain behaviour which, in the exercise of that power, or of that right, he is bound to maintain for the benefit of some other party.
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Bentham stresses that a trust is only appropriately so named if and when the person actually (i.e. demonstrably) receives or enjoys its benefit(s), and to mark this distinction he prefers the title 'beneficiendary' to the more conventional 'beneficiary'. 42 Perhaps this caveat contains the residue of any lingering scepticism that Bentham may have felt.
Bentham's discussion of the meaning of 'power' and 'right' in this context observes (not without misgivings about the terms themselves) 'that a power was a faculty, and that a right was a privilege'. 43 This is taken to mean that persons appointed as trustees are 'privileged' (i.e., gain kudos socially by being entrusted to fulfil this role) and that their 'faculty' was that they were authorised as legally and personally capable, i.e. 'accredited', to carry out such responsibilities as would fulfil the beneficiary's requirements and thereby comply with the terms of the trust.
powers', i.e. powers better described as obligatory responsibilities. A key distinction is that such powers invested in trustees are not exercised within power relations perse but flow from being authorised to act, etc., without corresponding to or depending upon reciprocation from/by the other party. By contrast, reciprocation on the part of a ward, express or implied, would necessarily be the case with exercise of representational powers, as in the agency relation discussed later.
It is initially difficult to reconcile Bentham's view of trust law with its modern counterpart, much of which is subsumed into areas of business and financial management. While now mainly providing a legally secure means of safeguarding property in a person's estate in order for it to be made available to present or future beneficiaries, the relation of trustee-beneficiary remains the essential means by which this is assured and trust law provides important safeguards to maintain the integrity of trustees.
The understated but essential protective role of guardians as trustees stems from their formal responsibility for ensuring that sufficient safeguards are in place to stand the best chance of realising the trust's objectives; and, so far as provision within the trust allows, to ensure that beneficiaries actually gain and that the gain is in their own best interests. Conversely, any relation based on one party protecting another is only viable if the 'protectee' trusts the protector, allowing for the fact that younger or more mentally disordered wards may not be able to experience or express trust between themselves and others.
Bentham's perception of guardian-ward relations as a trust relation provides a link between the legal and social aspects of his thinking. Not only should the law of guardian and ward be based in part on trustee-beneficiary relations, the need for trust is upheld as the necessary basis of the relation in its ordinary ethical sense. The nub of the trust concept in both senses is the obligations and responsibilities of trustees to do whatever is necessary to fulfil the objectives and terms of the trust.
Agency and representation
Pitkin's review of various meanings of 'representation' includes' [...] the idea of taking care of or looking after the interests or welfare of another'. 44 In practice this requires an arrangement or understanding between parties such that a relationship exists whereby one person's primary sets of interests, wishes/aspirations, intentions, life goals, etc., are 'taken on', in total or in part, i.e. by another. The rationale for the choice of guardians to fulfil this role would be that they were the persons most likely to be able to realise these goals and to do so better than wards could do alone.
Set against this position is Pitkin's earlier argument that guardians are no more the representatives of their wards than are headmasters of their pupils or parents of their children. 45 The critical difference here, however, is that headmasters and parents have interests of their own to represent; they have their own agendas that not only differ from, but could be in conflict with, those of their pupils/children. followed either of these paths. What is asserted is that his formulation paved the way for such developments and on this basis alone and we are justified in referring to this henceforth as the agency basis for guardian-ward relations.
Power dimensions
As indicated above, Bentham describes the legal basis of guardians' 'powers of control' as coming within the 'private dominion' subcategory of imperation powers.
He then divided private dominion powers into two further classes -'beneficiary' and 'fiduciary' powers. These Bentham illustrated by contrasting master-servant relations with guardian-ward relations. In master-servant relations, he identifies masters as the 'superior' party and as being the prime gainers from it; masters are said to exercise a beneficiary power over servants. In relations of guardian and ward, on the other hand, wards are the 'inferior' party but are presumed to be prime gainers from it. Guardians exercise a fiduciary power.
Bentham's use of terms 'superior' and 'inferior' might suggest that he considered guardianship to be an institution with a built-in status difference between guardians and wards. However, Bentham's contention was probably that these terms spelt out the critically important power difference between persons, albeit differences that may well have a social class basis (other than where guardian-ward relations were located within the same family). From this standpoint the power of 'superior'
persons was likely to be derived from their elevated position in society from which they had acquired authority. Such persons were able to use power relations primarily to serve their own interests. Conversely, 'inferior' persons occupied lower social status, were relatively 'powerless', and so tended to be on 'the receiving end' of power illustrates a particular kind of legally founded imposition in which the less powerful person authorises the other to exercise power(s) on his/her behalf -power(s) that he/she does not posses and/or cannot acquire and/or that may be in conflict with the latter's apparent wishes. Principals give agents authority to make such decisions or take such actions on their behalf by operation of agency law. They do so basically because they recognise that such agents 'know best' (or 'can-do better').
Modern guardianship under mental health legislation provides a fixed formula arguably based on an assumed need for three imposed powers over wards ('patients') namely, to determine their place of residence, their attendance (at specific places) and to ensure that guardians have access to them. 54 The flexibility 54 Section 7, Mental Health Act, 1983.
required to ensure that this serves wards' best interests and moves towards empowerment is considerable. Research has shown that this is only be achieved in practice by creative actions by guardian social workers.
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Turning to Empowerment, that might be described as a power relation in reverse, it could be said that this applies where a more powerful person shares or 'lends' his/her power to a less powerful other. The latter gains strength by having the other's power to support him/her and is enabled to become 'powerful enough' to proceed without the assistance of the other. The expression 'power exchange' has been coined to describe such circumstances. 56 Here the gainer is more clearly the less powerful person (e.g. where gain includes becoming 'more powerful') but the more powerful person may gain in a number of ways: his/her own satisfaction, social kudos or professional recognition.
Arguably guardians can only empower wards if they themselves are empowered by legitimate authority. The maxim that the legitimisation of power comes from authority might not seem prerequisite for empowerment in the same way as it is with imposed power. However, the difference is that the legitimisation of empowerment proceeds from a different underlying assumption namely, that a less powerful person only accepts the exercise of power by the other if the latter conveys credibility and capability. In other words, the former is perceived by the other as acting legitimately and as carrying authority, albeit of a personal kind.
Fiduciary dimensions
Contemporary uses of the word 'fiduciary' include adjectival descriptions of a wide range of terms, i.e. law, doctrine, obligations, duties, principles and power, as well as to describe a particular kind of relation between persons. This latter use of the term, placing it within a relational context, is the main focus of this discussion. Nevertheless it's meaning remains elusive and an assessment that it possessed 'a mystique only beginning to melt', would seem to have been optimistic. 57 In fact we find that Bentham's actual description of obligations within guardianship is essentially consistent with a specifically identified fiduciary relation.
Guardians serve the best interests of wards and are obligated to represent their wards'
interests-not the possibly conflicting interests of others, i.e. of the guardians themselves or third parties. Being in a fiduciary relation with their wards means that they are 'duty bound' to put the interests of wards first. Therefore wards' trust, confidence and reliance on guardians are essential preconditions, together with the associated vulnerability of both kinds described above. The difficulty of squaring these principles with the basis upon which guardians operate, i.e. on a free-standing basis or within agencies, was discussed earlier in the context of how guardians are selected.
Such a stringent definition of fiduciary relations might suggest that guardians as fiduciaries were not expected to have interests of their own, but this does not follow from Bentham's exposition. Most obviously, guardians would have normal human 65 Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries, p. 57. 66 Ibid., p. 60. 67 Gautreau, 'The Fiduciary Mystique', p. 1. 68 Ibid., p. 5. Gautreau's article needs to be read in context, namely as a commentary on current trends, the general thrust of which is not here challenged.
interests possibly as parents (of their own offspring well as possibly of wards). And, as has been mentioned apropos trusts, guardians may attain the 'privilege' (kudos) that being a trustee affords. Their other legitimate interests would include ensuring the effectiveness and integrity of their role as guardians and maintaining the credibility of the institution, matters that will sooner or later further ward's interests.
Overall it can be said that guardian-ward relations defined as fiduciary highlight special requirements of personal care, and indicate the way responsibility of one person for a vulnerable other is exercised, a consideration notably absent from Blackstone's account. Taken together with 'a duty of care' (part of common law of tort rather than law of fiduciaries), these elements are judged to under-lie the primary care responsibility within guardian-ward relations.
Although power and fiduciary dimensions have been separately described it is obviously important that they combine together in practice. As a fiduciary relation, the impact of the power dimension means that guardians need to exercise imposed power 'over' their wards appropriately, i.e. to ensure the latter's protection and representation. By this measure, inappropriate use of power would include meeting the guardian's rather than the ward's needs, e.g. simply to make his/her task easier.
Power exercised in the fiduciary relation substitutes equitably for that person's 'lack of power' and furthers that person's interests.
Bringing together the fiduciary and power dimensions within guardian-ward relations ensures that: (a) power relations are modified by fiduciary imperatives; and (b) that the fiduciary relation is supported by beneficial power(s). Seemingly it is this intermix that gives guardian-ward relations their distinct character.
Conclusions
Without due allowance for the limited scope of Bentham's exposition, students of guardianship could be justified in criticising the net result for being a-historical, The representational function has fared less well in this respect than protection. This is a particular area of current concern in residential care where prioritising a safe environment and providing overall protection can work against an individual's representational needs. Recent studies of elder abuse have found residents of care homes being physically restrained, not for their own sake but to 71 May, Existential Psychotherapy. maintain a relatively tranquil and compliant regime. 73 To counter this trend it is being argued that the representational role needs reasserting more strongly, and that independent guardians need to have powers to intervene effectively on behalf of those unable to speak up for themselves. 74 These suggestions, taken together with Bentham's insights into the meaning of fiduciary relations, highlight the unresolved question, discussed above, as to whether guardians' full accountability to their wards is compatible with accountability to others in authority such as an employing agency.
Overall it is contended that because Bentham's 'relational' starting point was right, his formulation answers questions as to guardianship's purpose and function that are as relevant to-day as they were in Bentham's time, albeit in a very different social environment. Sufficient has hopefully been said to answer our original question positively: in the absence of empirical evidence that wards benefited from guardianship, it is maintained that Bentham's account did provide a firm foundation for believing that such benefit was being realised and/or that benefit would be realised if his important ethical and legal requirements as to the structure and function of guardian-ward relations were adhered to.
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